Chabahar Port India Agreement

The first phase of the port of Chabahar was inaugurated in December 2017 by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and opened a new strategic road linking Iran, India and Afghanistan bypassing Pakistan. Iran`s Sistan and Baluchestan province, where the port of Chabahar is located, is also the scene of the insurgency activities of the Jundallah insurgent group, which claims to be fighting for the rights of Sunni Muslims[92] and the local Baloch ethnic group. [93] In 2010, Jundallah fighters sent a suicide bomber to a Shiite mosque in Chabahar, killing 38 people. [94] “The Chabahar agreement will expand trade, attract investment, build infrastructure and create jobs for our young people,” said Prime Minister Narendra Modi. India has been uneasy in observing Chinese funding for a strategic port in Gwadar, Pakistan, which New Delhi believes will allow Beijing access to the Indian Ocean region. In response, New Delhi began negotiations with Tehran more than a decade ago to develop the port of Chabahar to counter Chinese movements in what is considered part of India`s sphere of influence. “It is natural that Iran should secure its own interests, and long-term agreements with allies like China and Russia are a step in that direction,” he told Anadolu news agency, expressing anonymity. The heavily overcrowded port of Bandar Abbas is not a deep-water port and cannot handle 250,000-ton cargo ships. Currently, these ships are shipped to the United Arab Emirates (United Arab Emirates) and the cargo is transferred to small vessels of 100,000 tons to be shipped to Iran. This makes Iran dependent on the United Arab Emirates for deliveries and represents a shortfall.

Unlike Bandar Abbas, Chabahar has the ability to handle standard cargo ships. [21] In the face of U.S. trade restrictions on Iran, India had reduced oil imports from Iran, but the United States did not intervene directly in the development of the port because “conservative analysts in (Washington) DC have agreed that India should maintain some form of relations with Iran, Iran is instead concerned with a transportation corridor to Afghanistan; that it has no interest in advancing Iran`s agenda in the Middle East; And that no matter what India evacuates there, China is filled,” said Washington Heritage Foundation South Asia expert Jeff Smith in November 2017. [57] In February 2019, Afghanistan launches a new export route to India through the port of Chabahar. At the opening of the new export route, according to official data, 23 trucks carrying 57 tons of dried fruit, textiles, carpets and mineral products were sent from the southwestern Afghan city of Zaranj to the Iranian port of Chabahar. The show will be shipped to Mumbai. [79] April 18, 2016 – Chabahar Agreement. India, Afghanistan and Iran enter into a trilateral agreement for the development of Chabahar as a regional shopping centre.

India is committed to supplying steel for a railway linking Chabahar to the border towns of Zahedan and Mr. Mchhad. March 9, 2016 – China announces it will build an additional 3.2 km of mooring in the port of Gwadar. As 90% of the Iranian population is concentrated in the western part of the country, the eastern part is relatively less developed. Iran intends to change this with the development around the port of Chabahar, with a free trade area and road and rail links between Chabahar and Central Asia. Its plan is to use the port of Chabahar as a gateway to Central Asia and to preserve the port of Bandar Abbas, which currently manages 85% of Iran`s maritime trade, as a hub for trade with Russia and Europe. [15] The trilateral transit agreement signed by India, Iran and Afghanistan allows Indian goods to access Afghanistan via Iran. It connects ports on the west coast of India to the port of Chabahar and includes road and rail links between Chabahar and the Afghan border.

[47] An ancient port called Tis in the Chabahar district dates from 2500 BC, known for the Alexander-Spanish conquests. [Citation required] Alberuni wrote that the Indian coast begins with Tis. [23]